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RESUMO – A questão da dissolução e manutenção do Estado é um 
aspecto da filosofia política de Hobbes que ainda não mereceu um 
exame na mesma extensão e importância geralmente atribuídas a 
outros temas pertencentes aos seus escritos políticos. Evidencio 
neste estudo a preocupação do filósofo inglês em mostrar que a 
ciência de conservar Estados possui o mesmo valor e calibre científico 
filosófico do que a ciência de construir Estados. A divisão tripartite 
deste estudo tem como propósito investigar, primeiro, as causas e os 
personagens associados à dissolução do Estado, depois, os preceitos 
e artifícios relacionados à manutenção do Estado e, por fim, os atos 
de hostilidades (traição e espionagem, por exemplo) que necessitam 
ser conhecidos e combatidos pelo representante soberano porque 
afrontam e contradizem o imperativo de segurança salus populi suprema 
lex (a segurança do povo é lei suprema) e os princípios de razão que 
sustentam in totum a arquitetônica pública hobbesiana.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Vontade. Paixão. Medo. Contrato.
ABSTRACT – The question of dissolution and maintenance of the state 
is an aspect of Hobbes’s political philosophy that has not yet received 
a survey to the same extent and importance usually attributed to other 
issues pertaining to his political writings. I emphasize in this study the 
English philosopher’s concern to show that the science of conserving 
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States has the same value and scientific philosophical caliber than the 
science of building States. The tripartite division of this study aims to 
investigate first the causes and the characters associated with the 
dissolution of the state, then the precepts and processes related to the 
maintenance of the State and, finally, the acts of hostilities (treason 
and espionage, for example) that need be known and combated by 
the sovereign representative because someone else affronts and 
contradicts the security imperative salus populi suprema lex (safety of 
the people is the supreme law) and the principles of reason that sustain 
in totum the Hobbesian public architectonic.
KEYWORDS – Will. Passion. Fear. Contract.
Risk of State dissolution and the return to the state of nature
The risk of State dissolution is the main risk in the representative 
sovereign being unable to represent the citizens and the single political 
will, due to the implosion of its unifying steeples, to be diluted in a 
multiplicity of private wills whose tragic end is the return of the people to 
the condition of crowd. This occurs when every man’s passions (passions 
of war) find a proper environment for the development of its naturally 
conflictive character and the wills of each person resume being oriented 
by private judgments in which the criteria for actions (e.g., good, bad) is 
subjectively established by each individual from the ineffectiveness of 
the civil law as objective criterion of conduct.
The risk of state dissolution is, above all, the risk of generalized 
human conflict relapsing in a dramatic (but also rhetoric for forcing civil 
obedience in face of expected disturbances in a near and dark future) 
conjecture known as return to the state of nature. The idea of a possible 
return to the state of nature is discussed in Chapter 12 of De Cive and in 
Chapter 29 of Leviathan in terms of an investigation about things and 
causes that weaken the State and lead to its dissolution. In general, both 
books identify deficiencies of national order in the edification of political 
structures incapable of interrupting seditious or revolutionary processes 
in progress. However, in De Cive, of 1640, the first cause identified for the 
dissolution is the reversion of the objective criterion for good and evil for 
the subjective criterion, suggesting that the first cause of turmoil arises 
from the subjects’ passions, i.e., “the doctrines and passions contrary 
to peace, which provide men’s minds with a certain conformation and 
disposition.” On the other hand, in Leviathan, of 1651, an error of calculus 
– lethal for a res publica – is established as the first cause of seditions, 
rebellions, and revolutions arising from rulers who believe it unnecessary 
for their position the use of political power in all its extension (absolute 
power):C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
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A man to obtain a Kingdom, is sometimes content with less Power, than 
to the Peace, and defense of the Common-wealth is necessarily required. 
From whence it commeth to pass, that when the exercise of the Power 
laid by, is for the public safety to be resumed, it hath the resemblance 
of an unjust act; which disposeth great numbers of men to rebel […]
And when Kings deny themselves some such necessary Power, it is 
not always (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary 
to the office they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover 
the same again at their pleasure: Wherein they reason not well (Lev., 
Chapter XXIX, p. 248).
The absence of a power necessary for the maintenance of public 
peace and order is described as the first debilitating cause in a State 
whose ruler uses reason incorrectly. The inversion in the order of reasons 
of turmoil based on the subjects-citizens’ passionateness (De Cive) for 
the unreason of rulers (Leviathan) may be explained through historical 
elements. At least this is what some Hobbes scholars suggest when they 
say that English King Charles I’s fall (in the context of the English Civil 
War), contemporary to Hobbes, was interpreted by the philosopher as 
due to the insufficient power of the King concerning the conservation 
and maintenance of his State.
The first and the second structural causes of social turmoil and 
disturbance are respectively, the imperfect institution of a State and 
seditious doctrines. The imperfect institution is caused fundamentally 
by the deprivation of power for the ruler (absence of absolute power): 
“such damages or shifts are all Common-wealths forced to, that have 
their Power never so little limited” (Lev, Ch. XXIX, p. 248). Seditious 
doctrines are enclosed in beliefs and opinions that turn questions proper 
to public judgment in questions related to private judgment. The first of 
these doctrines (and, according to Hobbes, the most poisonous one) is 
the opinion that the distinction criterion for good and evil actions lies in 
the minds and judgments of private individuals contrarily to the interests 
of the Civil Law and the representative of the Common-wealth (Judge 
Legislator) (idem, ibid.).
Deduced from the first and primary doctrine, the five following 
seditious doctrines evidence (a) the error of considering private conscience 
as the measure of good and evil instead of public conscience as Civil 
Law (supreme criterion of distinction between good and evil actions in 
the public order); (b) the belief that faith is reached only supernaturally 
– let us remember that Hobbes’s materialistic metaphysics confutes 
the supernatural as something completely deprived of sense (non 
sense) – leaving the reasons of faith aside, which leads to individuals 
directing their actions through beliefs based on their supernatural   C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
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inspirations:1 “And thus we fall again into the fault of taking upon us to 
judge of good and evil; or to make judges of it, such private men as pretend 
to be supernaturally inspired, to the dissolution of all civil government” 
(idem, p. 249-230). Hobbes investigates then the 3 other seditious doctrines, 
which will not be discussed here, due to the focus of this study.
Then, Hobbes addresses the mistake of trying to imitate (perhaps he 
was thinking about an in totum imitation) the public administration and 
political constitution of foreign countries, showing how it can disturb the 
order and internal defense of a nation, compelling individuals to want 
another government. He also discusses the seeds of war which are found 
in the opposition between political authority and religious authority 
as an important cause of seditions (Hobbes believes that the religious 
instance should be subordinated to the State) and he ends up referring 
to causes less inclined to seditions (but crucial to the conservation of 
states), such as the frustrated attempt, by the ruler, in increasing public 
budget in times of imminent war (as actually occurred in 17th Century 
England when the English Parliament refused money to the King). The 
philosopher concludes in saying that when nothing can be done to impede 
a revolutionary process, the State may be considered dissolved:
Lastly, when in a war (foreign or intestine), the enemies get a final victory; 
so as (the forces of the Common-wealth keeping the field no longer) there 
is no farther projection of subjects in their loyalty; then is the Common-
wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect himself by such 
courses as his own discretion shall suggest to him (idem, p. 257).
Saying that every man has the liberty of defending himself is saying 
that men has regained their natural rights, previously resigned due to 
the State’s protofounder covenant and that they have just returned to the 
state of nature, since as the State’s ultimate aim is its people’s security, 
when it can no longer protect the subjects and citizens, there is no more 
reason for its existence, as a body deprived of its soul, “for the Sovereign 
is the public soul, giving life and motion to the Common-wealth; which 
expiring, the Members are governed by it no more” (idem, ibid.). The 
following considerations will address Hobbes’s science of conservation 
of the State. A kind of rational public antidote against State dissolution, 
the science of conservation has as an axiomatic starting point the 
imperative of security salus populi suprema Lex (the people’s security is 
the supreme law).
1  The opinion that individual conscience is the belief that faith is reached only 
supernaturally, dispensing with reason, is seditious since it allows thinking the field 
of action of religion as independent from public order.C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
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The safety imperative and the science of conservation
The conservation or maintenance of a political state is linked to the 
representative sovereign’s (ruler) ability of fulfilling the requisites of his 
office and providing for its fulfillment, thus avoiding the risk of dissolution 
and the resulting return to the state of nature. The political power is 
consensually afforded to him – differently from naturalistic political 
theories – as a necessary means (search mechanism) to guarantee 
the realization of the safety imperative – i.e., the safety of the people 
– as the supreme finality of modern political architectonics. The poor 
conduction of the most important public office to the nation may result 
in the substitution of consensus by dissension, in other words, the “regret 
of one [or more than one] of the contractors” 2 and the instauration of 
an irreversible revolutionary process. Political apostasy – the splitting 
or desertion of subjects-citizens from the constituted political body – is 
the visible mark of government actions in contradiction with the safety 
imperative salus populi suprema lex. (The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 
describes social or political contradiction as “a pair [or set] of factors that 
together produce an unstable tension in a social or political system.3
The representative sovereign needs firstly to be watchful of his 
essential rights in their integrity as those experts in polishing rare 
crystals, because “if the essential Rights of Sovereignty be taken away, 
the Common-wealth is thereby dissolved” (Lev., Ch. XXX, p. 258). The 
risk of the dissolution of the Commonwealth and the resulting return 
to the “condition and calamity of a war with other men (which is the 
greatest evil that may come by in this life)” should be sufficient, a sine 
qua non condition, for every supreme ruler follow the precepts inherent 
to his officium. Indeed, the representative sovereign’s power (one of his 
essential rights) should be unlimited, absolute and indivisible, because 
otherwise there may be a return to the horrors of the state of nature. 
Resigning this fundamental clause, transferring part of his power to 
another or even renouncing his power is incompatible with the nature 
of his office and it offends the principles of reason of the art and science 
of building enduring political states:
And as the art of well building, is derived from Principles of Reason, observed 
by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the 
divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began (though 
poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to constitute Common-
wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may, Principles of 
Reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution 
(excepting by external violence) everlasting (Lev., Ch. XXX, p.260).
2  Cf. second meaning of “dissenso” in Dicionário Aurélio (electronic version).
3  Dicionário Oxford de filosofia.C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
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In a well built state according to rational principles, the essential 
rights of sovereignty are respected and the absolute character of the 
political power is affirmed and effectively exercised. But sedition and 
rebellion belong to the concupiscent part of the human being, and 
the ruler should be consistently attentive to opinion former leaders. 
Superstition, curiosity about what is new and different, the resource of 
the supernatural to explain religious authority’s rise on political authority 
may, each in its own terms, beget an unprecedented revolutionary 
process. Therefore, the representative sovereign needs a broad and acute 
political view to detect in due time hostility acts contrary to the people’s 
and the nation’s security. Among the hostility acts are the acts of high 
treason (lese-majesty) and acts of espionage.
Hostility acts and political view
In April 5th 1656, 5 years after the publication of Leviathan, François 
du Verdu (1621-1675)4 wrote to Hobbes requiring advices on how to act 
and what statements to make on the occasion of his oncoming travel to 
England. The motivating factor for this requirement was that, worried 
about preserving his reputation as subdeacon, he feared he would be 
seen in England as “a spy, which is an unworthy profession of a natural 
born gentleman, a philosopher and an honorable man.” In addition, Du 
Verdu confesses, “I have no inclinations to such a dangerous profession.”5 
Sometime after, Hume claimed that “being a spy, or a corrupter, is 
always infamous in the category of all the ministers, and it is considered 
similar to a shameful prostitution.”6 The same view is held by Kant, for 
whom espionage is unacceptable on the grounds of the impossibility of 
universalizing the mistake and the resulting despise for human dignity. 
According to Kant, one of the means forbidden by international law (law 
of nations) is that of “using one’s own subjects for espionage… or yet only 
to disseminate false news; in a word, employing fraudulent means which 
would destroy the confidence necessary to found a lasting peace.”7
In a general view, the philosophy of espionage can be subdivided 
in at least two traditions or two distinct and antagonistic types of 
reflections concerning secret activities in a historical and/or theoretical 
context. The first tradition, negative, expresses a moral aversion to 
espionage. The second tradition, positive, justifies the Intelligence   
 
4  French writer, friend to Hobbes and translator of some of his works. 
5  Correspondências de Thomas Hobbes, v. I, p. 263. (Edição eletrônica Past Master).
6  Hume: Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, pt. 1 E. 6 Foot. 2 mp. 45 gp. 121 (Edição 
eletrônica Past Master).
7  Kant: Metafísica dos Costumes, parte II, Doutrina do Direito, p. 196.C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
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Service as unequivocally necessary to public safety. Hobbes’s reflections 
on Secret Service are included in the latter tradition. Hobbes’s view on 
the subject, however, is not limited to his defense of the Intelligence 
Service as necessary to the maintenance of modern political states. This 
work will show that Hobbes is not a realist (pure) or a radical advocate 
of the realpolitik in regards to the necessary character of the Intelligence 
Service.8 The support for his theses on the necessity of the Secret Service 
springs from a moral fundament structured by the safety imperative 
Salus populi suprema lex, i.e., the people’s safety is the supreme law   
(E.L., p. 172).
Treason in the public sphere:9 nature and extension
Hamil Grant remarks in Spies and secret service: the story of espionage, 
its main systems and chief exponents that in ancient Rome the act of 
spying was accepted as a fair stratagem in war and politics and, at 
least in theory, it was considered different from the act of treason. 
Technically defined, says Grant, the spy is “someone who deceptively 
seeks information” and the traitor is “someone who spies within his own 
community for its ruin or destruction.” In the case of treason, concludes 
Grant, few disagree that “death is the only logical desert for the man 
who has seized the secrets upon which common safety is dependent.”10 
Quentin Skinner, in Visions of Politics, reminds us that until a point in the 
16th Century there was a marked ambivalence between the concept of 
loyalty (referred to reverence to the sovereign) and the concept of treason 
(referred to disloyal conduct to the sovereign). Indeed, the 1532 statute 
was introduced in Renascence England with the purpose of establishing 
a definition of treason for, from then on, include the crime of contriving 
or plotting the King’s death. The renascence conception of treason as 
an offence committed against the King’s person in his office is, however, 
replaced in the 17th Century, says Skinner, by the conception of treason as 
an offence or outrage essentially against the State and only secondarily 
against the King. Skinner believes that this significant alteration of the 
meaning and concept of treason, occurred in the 17th century, may be 
attributed to Hobbes’s ingenuity on the referred term:
8  A classification attributed to Hobbes by political writers associated to the International 
Relations Theory.
9  The phrase public treason will be used to differentiate treason in the public sphere 
from other types of treason. The phrase, however, is not fully adequate to differentiate 
treason committed against the res publica from the others, since to Hobbes, those who 
betray the public person of the State are considered persons who exchanged public for 
private space.
10  p. 18-19.C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
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As so often, it is Hobbes who states the new understanding most 
unequivocally. He declares at the end of his analysis of dominion in the 
English version of De Cive that those who are guilty of treason are those 
who refuse to perform the duties ‘without which the State cannot stand’.11
Before explaining the nature of treason in the article 20 of the Chapter 
XIV of De Cive, Hobbes states, in a footnote to the article 19, that the 
term enemy is sharper than the term unjust (DC, p. 179-108). 12 12 Article 
20, then, soon after defining the act of public treason as “renounce to 
public obedience,” clarifies that public traitors are all those persons who, 
through words or acts (expressed, tacit or secret), risk national security13 
and, consequently, has his condition of citizen replaced by the condition 
of enemy of the State. Hobbesian identification of traitor and enemy was 
not uncontroversial in the age when he lived. The famous British jurist and 
politician Edward Coke (1552-1634), for instance, did not acknowledge 
the legality of the traitor-enemy identification.14 The term enemy, in 
Hobbes, is broader than unjust. In the state of nature no one commits 
unjust acts before the effectuation of the third law of nature, properly 
called by Hobbes law of justice. Frauds, deceits, thefts, murders and all 
the kinds of “secret machinations” may, in man’s natural condition, be 
justified in name of the natural right of life preservation. Wherein nothing 
is unjust and insecurity, inserted in a kind of logic of fatality, reveals the 
certainty of one’s own death as the result of a calculus whose sum reveals 
a high degree of lethality, human interactions may be expected to be 
determined by reciprocal hostility acts. In a political state, public enemies, 
cited in De Cive and Behemoth as “traitors, regicides, and rebels,”15 once 
judged and condemned for treason, have their punishment decreed by 
the natural law of war and not by civil right, since in renouncing to obey 
sovereign authority, they started interacting with it in a private manner 
and no longer in a public manner. Exceeding the dominion of civil law   
(established to determine the conduct of subjects among themselves and   
11  Skinner, Q. Visions of Politics (vol. I-III).
12  Sorbière translates this passage in the following manner: “the term enemy is more 
atrocious than the term unjust” (De Cive, p. 266).
13  According to Dicionário Hobbes (cf. excuses), there are many gradual variations of risk 
to State security. Among the most perilous ones is the act of revealing secrets of the 
State to the enemy, in the national and international planes.
14  Coke’s refusal motivated the following objection by Hobbes in the Dialogue…: “But Sir 
Edward Coke does seldom well distinguish, when there are two divers names for one 
and the same thing: though one contain the other, he makes them always different; as 
if it could not be that one and the same man should be both an enemy and a traitor” 
(Hobbes: DLGE p. 73).
15  Cf. the list of traitors in Behemoth. Cf. also Stephen Holmes’s introduction to Behemoth 
and the article History of the English Civil War: A Study of Behemoth (cf. Bibliographical 
references in the end of this study.) C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
34  Veritas, v. 57, n. 1, jan./abr. 2012, p. 26-40
between them and the sovereign), traitors suspend their obligations and 
put themselves in the situation of war with the sovereign power, similarly 
to rival sovereigns fighting for power and more power in an international 
state of nature. The natural right of war, and not the positive civil right, 
is the right to be applied by the sovereign power to its public enemies, 
since “the rebels, traitors and other persons condemned for treason will 
not be punished… as civil subjects, as enemies of the state”.16
Public treason contradicts the reason to be of the modern political 
state, i.e., sovereignty legitimized by consented public obedience, so that 
reparation of damage must occur in the ambit of extreme graveness of the 
act carried out. Due to that, this type of treason is included among the crimes 
of high treason or lese-majesty.17 Among public traitors who commit crimes 
of high treason (lese-majesty), says Hobbes, are the spies. The Leviathan’s 
conclusion clarifies that he who lives secretly in a country “is subject to 
everything that may happen to a spy and enemy of the State… and may 
justly be condemned to death.” Spies-traitors are classified as public 
enemies. Their acts are hostility acts in relation to sovereign authority. 
Although they have not committed unjust acts, but hostile acts, they may, 
as Hobbes said, “be justly condemned to death.” Sorbière’s translation of 
article XXII (chapter XIV) of De Cive, where we read that “justice against 
the enemies of the State is exerted by the right of war” seems to make 
sense if compared to what Hobbes says in the Leviathan’s conclusion. 
Indeed, if, on the one hand, there are no just or unjust acts where there 
are no covenants (mainly the covenants of consented obedience), or where 
they did exist previously but were breached (reference made to hostiles, 
but not unjust, enemies of the State), it is just to apply capital punishment 
to those who risk the fundamental moral principle of the modern political 
state: salus populi or the safety of the people.
Criteria employed for punishing spies in the sphere of international 
relations refer to the right of war. Crossing frontiers to obtain information   
 
16  Sorbière translates “enemies to the government” into “ennemis de l´état”. The 
controversy about the distinction or indistinction between the public person of the 
State and the public or private person of the ruler was recently revived by Skinner. 
Indeed, Skinner speaks of traitors in Hobbes as traitors of the public person of the State 
and the private person of the King (?). Sorbière adds to this passage the word justice 
(which is absent in the Molesworth edition). According to Sorbière’s translation, “justice 
against the enemies of the State is exerted by the right of war and not by the right of 
sovereignty”. We should ask whether is correct, in Hobbes, to speak of justice when 
the guilty ones are enemies that, by definition, do not commit unjust acts due to which 
they are accused and punished as private persons who transgressed natural instead of 
civil laws. In this sense, it is important to question whether the term trespasses (which, 
along with law, composes the title of the Chapter XIV of De Cive) may be translated 
into crime. Sorbière translates trespasses into offenses. 
17  Unlike low treason, currently in desuetude in many countries, high treason is considered 
to be the gravest crime a person can commit against a State or Ruler.C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
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means penetrating in the sphere of an international state of nature 
where those who have sovereign authority, due to their independence, 
live in rivalry, with arms aimed, looking at each other in the eye. The 
international state of nature demands that each State edifies forts, 
garrisons, and cannons, watching the frontiers, and the constant use, 
clarifies Hobbes, of “spies in their neighbors’ territory”.
Espionage and the safety imperative
The issue of the necessity of espionage is initially presented by 
Hobbes in the Chapter XIII of De Cive. The Article 7 of this chapter has 
as its title: “Discoverers18 are necessary for the People’s defense”.19 Once 
the People’s safety (salus populi) is determined as the supreme law of a 
sovereign ruler, this safety imperative says that those in charge of the 
public power must employ a series of measures to adequate their actions 
to such a noble purpose. Internal and external public enemies must be 
constantly watched to avoid the dissemination of rebellion and the seeds 
of war in the national as well as in the international plane. “It is therefore 
necessary to the defense of the City, first, that there be some who may 
as near as may be, search into, and discover the counsels and motions 
of all those who may prejudice it.” The political view of the State would 
have its field limited and decreased in the absence of secret agents, 
whose necessity for the preservation of the State is compared to the 
necessity of rays of light to the conservation of men. In addition to being 
necessary to national safety, the Intelligence Service is legitimate. The 
irrefutable thesis is that “They who bear Rule can no more know what 
is necessary to be commanded for the defense of their Subjects without 
Spies” supports the legitimacy of espionage:
Since therefore it necessarily belongs to Rulers for the Subjects safety 
to discover the Enemies Counsel…, it follows, that it is not only lawful 
for them to send out Spies, to maintain Soldiers, to build Forts, and to 
require Monies for these purposes, but also, not to doe thus, is unlawful.20 
(DC, Ch. XIII, p.160)
18  Origin of the word discoverer: cf. Merriam-Webster Dictionary (electronic version).
19  We remark that Chapter 13 is inserted between two chapters dealing with dissolution 
and maintenance of the State. 
20  The Intelligence Service is not considered clandestine by Hobbes. Spying is not only 
necessary, but also legitimate or legal. Not spying is not only illegitimate, but also 
immoral since the lack of a skilled and effective secret service is in conflict with the 
salus populi, supreme law of modern political state. The safety imperative salus populi in 
a rule of Law gives espionage a place beyond necessity: every ruler has the obligation 
(moral obligation, since, in the condition of natural law, it is obligatory only in foro 
interno) of employing secret agents to discover the secrets of their enemies.C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
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The term used by Hobbes in De Cive to refer to the secret agent is 
discoverer (although he also uses spies as synonymous to discoverer). From 
Late Latin, discooperire (dis-cover), discoverer dates from the 14th Century 
and it has a general meaning of to render known or visible by means of 
exploration or investigation.21 The common term used in Elizabethan 
England for secret agent or spy is intelligencer,22 which was firstly used 
in the 16th Century23 to designate a person who collects intelligence, 
i.e., who obtains information.24 The metaphor for spies as rays of light in 
De Cive may have been decisive for Hobbes to use discoverer instead 
of intelligencer, due to the visual component attached to the former. 
The reach and sharpness of the political view of modern states depend 
on the success of their spies in collecting secretive information. The 
creation and development of an Intelligence System in the 16th Century 
and its broadening and development in the 17th Century agree with the 
general form of structuring and maintenance of the modern political 
state: drawing upon all the means and instruments available to avoid 
its dissolution. Hobbes gave this precept the value of a duty. In his age, 
the philosopher perceived a certain weakness in the hesitating manner 
Charles I affirmed his authority and power. In writing Leviathan, Hobbes 
uses the word Spy as a synonym for secret agent. The Leviathan’s political 
view needs spies to discover the Commonwealth enemies’ invisible power 
in the same sense that human wants need thoughts as informers, i.e., 
as “scouts or spies”, to obtain information from the external world and 
choose the best way to reach their objects or “wanted things”.
In another letter addressed to Hobbes, written in December 1656, Du 
Verdu asks the English philosopher: “In talking about the spy, whom you 
compare to the [human] eye, you say that ‘the spy is a Private Minister, 
but a Minister of the Commonwealth’. Tell me, please, precisely if the 
spy is a private minister or a state minister or how can he be both at 
the same time.”25 This letter sent by Du Verdu refers to a passage in 
the Leviathan’s Chapter XXIII in which Hobbes says that a spy, i.e., a 
man secretly sent into another country, “may be compared to an eye in 
the natural body”. The metaphor of the spy as rays of light in De Cive is 
changed in Leviathan, where the spy is symbolically associated to the 
optic member in the human body. With the publication of Leviathan, 
the political view established in De Cive is no longer passive in relation 
to information gathering: the Leviathan view no longer depends on   
 
21  Cf. Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
22  Cf. Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
23  Invisible power, p. xiv. (see Bibliographical References in the end of this study).
24  Cf. Concise Oxford English Dictionary.
25  Correspondências de Thomas Hobbes, dezembro de 1656, p. 365.C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
  Veritas, v. 57, n. 1, jan./abr. 2012, p. 26-40  37
secret information brought by ray-of-light spies. The Leviathan-State 
henceforth has an Intelligence System to decipher the invisible power of 
its enemies through information gathering and decoding of secret codes. 
The Leviathan’s secret eye is the most effective antidote against a net 
of invisible powers that threaten the stability of political power and risk 
the safety of the people.26
In the abovementioned letter from Du Verdu to Hobbes a more 
thorough explanation is asked on the classification of a spy within the 
distinction public-private. I suggest that a likely answer from Hobbes to 
Du Verdu is compatible with the following argumentative development: 
– The Chapter XXIII of Leviathan begins by defining a public minister 
as someone who is mandated by the sovereign ruler to represent the 
State’s public person in his office and activity. A sovereign ruler, says 
Hobbes, holds two persons: one person defined by his natural capacity 
and another defined by his public capacity. Indeed, he who represents 
the State’s public person is the public minister and the one representing 
the ruler’s natural person is the private minister. Hobbes explains that 
“they that be servants to them in their natural capacity, are not Public 
Ministers” (Lev, Ch. XXIII, p. 184).
Let us consider the following example provided by Hobbes to clarify 
situations which resist being grouped in the distinction public-private: 
an ambassador sent abroad to partake in solemnities, whose visit is 
justified in the natural person of the ruler (i.e., in his private interests), 
“though Authority be Public; yet because the business is Private, and 
belonging to him in his natural capacity; is a Private person” (Lev, Ch. 
XXIII, p. 187-188). Another example of private person is found in the 
excerpt of Leviathan which arose doubts in Du Verdu on the true identity 
of the person of the spy. I quote the excerpt in its entirety:
Also if a man be sent into another Country, secretly to explore their 
counsels, and strength; though both the Authority, and the Business be 
Public; yet because there is none to take notice of any Person in him, but 
his own; he is but a Private Minister; but yet a Minister of the Common-
wealth; and may be compared to an Eye in the Body natural (Lev, Ch. 
XXIII, p. 188).
26  Indeed, the political view of the modern state has its field of vision broadened by 
the creation of the Intelligence Service. The Leviathan not only sees all the things 
underneath him (Chapter XX). He has “prospective glasses, (namely Moral and Civil 
Science,) to see afar off the miseries” that threaten the people’s safety, it can foresee 
the future translucently and, therefore, seek solutions in the present time to avoid future 
evils. One of these forethoughts allows seeing that, without the availability of certain 
financial resources, wars will be lost, and the State, weakened or dissolved (Chapter 
XVIII). Among these payments are those destined to the building of fortresses and the 
employment of spies.C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
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The fact that a secret agent cannot reveal the author of his mission 
prevents him to be considered a public minister. A secret agent is a 
private person due to the secrecy of the authority delegated by the 
State’s public person to carry on his plans and activities of his position. 
However, he is a State minister, i.e., a State minister of private nature. I 
suggest that the key to understand the classification of a spy under the 
distinction public-private is found in Chapter XVI of Leviathan, in which 
Hobbes analyzes the relation between the terms person, authorization, 
and representation. Curiously, the Latin origin of the word persona 
means disguise, mask, or visor, elements frequently associated to secret 
agents and spies. A spy is, above all, a natural person because “his 
words or actions are considered to be his own.” He does not stand for, 
in his secret acts, the State’s public person. He actually presents himself 
as a natural person at the same time as he represents a fictive person 
(persona ficta) disguised, created to conceal his true identity. He acts in 
his own name at the same time as he acts in name of a hidden public 
person (persona arcani). The authorization a secret agent receives from 
the State’s public person to carry out secret activities is proclaimed as a 
public authorization. Consequently, the act of spying, duly authorized, is 
a public act. But the actions carried out by the person of the spy (secret 
agent) in his natural capacities are the actions of a private person. The 
spy-natural person does not act in name of the State-public person, but 
actually in his own name and in that of a hidden person (persona arcani) 
that must never be revealed. His life and the life of a whole people may 
depend on his skill of alternating the visible and the invisible to see and 
be seen. The formula of success for a spy is quite simple: to discover 
secrets preventing his own secrets to be discovered.27
One of the Hobbes’s objections against democracy as a form of 
government is his skepticism in relation to the possibility of maintaining 
the State’s secrets in secrecy in public assemblies involving a great 
amount of people participation. “Secret deliberation”, according to 
Hobbes, is better preserved in the head of one natural person who 
holds at the same time the public person. The democratic principle of 
publicity, at least in thesis, antagonizes the secret in the public sphere. 
On a practical level, however, the secret service is considered necessary 
to preserve and fortify democracy. Norberto Bobbio understood the need   
 
27  Some studies on espionage indicate the proximity of Francis Bacon with the English 
Intelligence Service around the time Francis Walsingham, known as Spymaster of 
Queen Elizabeth I, provided, in a systematic manner, the modern bases for the English 
Intelligence System. Did Hobbes know Bacon’s secret life? Did Hobbes know the secrets 
of the Royal Family never revealed by him due to his loyalty to the King? Will we one 
day discover Thomas Hobbes’s secrets?C. R. C. Leivas – The science of the preservation of the State
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of the secret service for the maintenance of modern democracies. In 
Democracy and Secrecy he explains that
Democracy excludes, as line of principle, the secrecy of State, but the use 
of it, through the institution of security services, which act in secrecy, is 
justified, among other things, as a necessary instrument to ultimately 
defend democracy.
Nevertheless, Bobbio warns that “a debate dedicated to secrecy in 
the public sphere cannot be developed unless on the side of exception, 
not on that of rule.” At least this problem is not a part of the Hobbesian 
vocabulary related to secrets, secret agent, and Intelligence System. 
For him, the secrets of the State are justified by a rule or supreme law 
of the modern state: the imperative of safety salus populi.28 One last 
question: – To which extent does the principle of transparency and 
publicity as conceived by Hobbes may be compatible with the secrets 
of the Leviathan?
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